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UNITED STATES - AGRICULTURAL FINANCE - THE FARMERS HOME
ADMINISTRATION HAS A STATUTORY DUTY TO INFORM BORROWERS OF
LOAN DEFERRAL PROCEDURES PURSUANT TO 7 U.S.C. § 1981A AND TO
PROVIDE BORROWERS WITH NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE
HEARD BEFORE TERMINATING INCOME FOR NECESSARY LIVING AND
OPERATING EXPENSES
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs were North Dakota family farmers who had received
loans from the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA).' Due to
circumstances beyond their control, these farmers were temporarily
unable to repay their loans.2 Plaintiffs sought class action status in
order to represent all North Dakota family farmers who then held
or would hold farm program loans from the FmHA. 3 The
borrowers alleged hat officials of FmHA had violated
constitutional,4 statutory, and regulatory requirements. 5 Plaintiffs
1. Coleman v. Block, 562 F. Supp. 1353 (D.N.D. 1983). The Farmers Home Administration
(FmHA) is the principal lending institution through which the United States Government provides
credit to small family farmers. See 7 C.F.R. S 1941.1-.4 (1984). In order to qualify for credit, the
applicant must certify in writing that he cannot obtain adequate credit elsewhere to finance his needs
at reasonable rates and terms, taking into consideration the terms and rates of private and
cooperative sources. 7 C.F.R. § 1941.6 (1984). See also 7 C.F.R. 5 1941.12(a) (7) (1984) (to be
eligible for an operating loan, an individual must be unable to obtain sufficient credit elsewhere).
2. Brief for Plaintiffat 1, Coleman v. Block, 562 F. Supp. 1353 (D. N.D. 1983).
3. 562 F. Supp. at 1354-55. Plaintiffs argued that class action status was necessary to avoid
denying individual farmers and ranchers the benefit of notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Id. at
1357. If the court granted class action status FmHA's policies would affect all holders of FmHA farm
program loans within the State of North Dakota. Id. at 1356.
4. Id. at 1355. Plaintiffs alleged that FmHA was acting in part as a welfare agency and therefore
participation in the farmers loan program was a governmental benefit in which the plaintiffs had a
legitimate property interest. Id. at 1364. Plaintiffs argued that termination of a borrower's loan
program, without a pre-termination hearing, constituted a deprivation of property without adequate
due process. Id. at 1365.
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that: "No person shall be . ..
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law... . " U.S. CoNsw. amend. V.
5. 562 F. Supp. at 1355. The plaintiffs argued that FmHA had a mandatory duty to promulgate
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alleged inter alia that FmHA had refused to allow the farmers'
applications for deferment of loans under section 1981 a of title 7 of
the United States Code (U.S.C.),6 had terminated funds to farmers
for necessary living and operating expenses, and had subjected
farmers to a biased and unconstitutional appeals process. 7 The
United States District Court for the State of North Dakota granted
a preliminary injunction and held that FmHA had a statutory duty
to inform borrowers of the availability of loan deferrals, and that
FmHA must give farmers notice and an opportunity to be heard
before terminating income for necessary living and operating
expenses. 8 Coleman v. Block, 562 F. Supp. 1353 (D.N.D. 1983).
Six months later the court expanded the statewide class to a
national class. 9 The preliminary injunction then applied with
respect to all FmHA borrowers except for borrowers residing in
states where borrowers had requested, or a court had certified, a
statewide class on similar legal issues. 10
Approximately three months after national
class certification, the court adopted by reference its reasoning and
conclusions contained in the order granting a preliminary
injunction and ordered a permanent injunction, applicable to the
national class.11 FmHA appealed this decision and the plaintiff
regulations implementing 7 U.S.C. § 1981a (1982), and that FmHA's failure to do so violated
statutory and regulatory requirements. Id. at 1360.
6. Id. at 1355. Section 1981a of title 7 of the United States Code states as follows:
In addition to any other authority that the Secretary may have to defer principal
and interest and forego foreclosure, the Secretary may permit, at the request of the
borrower, the deferral of principal and interest on any outstanding loan made,
insured, or held by the Secretary under this chapter, or under the provisions of any
other law administered by the Farmers Home Administration, and may forego
foreclosure of any such loan, for such period as the Secretary deems necessary upon a
showing by the borrower that due to circumstances beyond the borrower's control, the
borrower is temporarily unable to continue making payments of such principal and
interest when due without unduly impairing the standard of living of the borrower.
The Secretary may permit interest that accrues during the deferral period on any loan
deferred under this section to bear no interest during or after such period: Provided,
that if the security instrument securing such loan is foreclosed such interest as is
included in the purchase price at such foreclosure shall become part of the principal
and draw interest from the date of foreclosure at the rate prescribed by law.
7 U.S.C. S 1981a(1982).
7. Coleman, 562 F. Supp. at 1355. Plaintiffs alleged that using the state director of FmHA or
other district directors as hearing officers subjected the farmers to a biased and unconstitutional
appeals process. Id. at 1366.
8. Id. at 1367-68.
9. Coleman v. Block, 580 F. Supp. 192 (D.N.D. 1983). The court found that the rationale it had
applied to grant a statewide preliminary injunction was equally applicable to the national class. Id.
at 193. Following a hearing on a motion by the plaintiffs to expand the class, the court granted the
plaintiffs permission to amend the complaint to include persons similarly situated throughout the
United States. Id. at 192-93.
10. Id. at 192-93. The court excluded from the national class borrowers who had filed actions
that directly related to "the implementation of 7 U.S.C. S 1981a, the constitutionality of a pre-
hearing cut-off of necessary family living and farm operating expenses, and the constitutionality of
the Farmers Home Administration appeals procedures." Id.
11. Coleman v. Block, 580 F. Supp. 194, 210 (D.N.D. 1984). In determining whether the
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borrowers cross-appealed.
The purpose of this Article is to discuss the history of federal
agricultural lending, analyze the court's decision to grant a
preliminary injunction, and discuss the court's decision to make the
injunction permanent.
II. HISTORY OF GOVERNMENTAL FARM LOAN
PROGRAMS
The federal government has extended agricultural credit to
farmers for over 120 years, beginning with the Homestead Act of
1862.12 This Act provided small-scale family farmers with
opportunities to farm.13 The first direct government lending began
in 1918 with an appropriation from Congress for crop and seed
loans to farmers suffering natural disasters. 14 When President
Roosevelt established the Farm Credit Administration 15 in 1933,
Congress placed the crop and seed loan office under the
Administration's general supervision. 16
The Emergency Relief Act, 17 passed in 1933, provided
distressed farm families with loans designed to help them continue
their operations and reduce relief roles. 8 While the federal
government has provided credit to farmers for more than 120
years, FmHA traces its origin to legislation enacted during the
Depression of the 1930's. The Resettlement Administration,
created by executive order in 1935, was the earliest predecessor to
FmHA. 19 This Agency made loans to farmers settling in rural areas
and provided supervision for farm operators.20
In 1937 Congress passed the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant
Act, 21 which authorized loans to farm tenants for the purchase of
injunction should be permanent, the court applied a three-part test. Id. at 209. For a discussion of the
reasoning and conclusions adopted by the court in granting a permanent injunction, see infra notes
110-68 and accompanying text.
12. Gurry v. Block, 541 F. Supp. 506, 509 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (citing the Homestead Act, ch. 75,
12 Stat. 392, 392-93 (1862)).
13. Curry, 541 F. Supp. at 509.
14. Brake, A Perspective on Federal Involvement in Agricultural Credit Programs, 19 S.D.L. REv. 567,
580 (1974).
15. Exec. Order No. 6084 (1933).
16. Brake, supra note 14, at 580.
17. Federal Emergency Relief Act, ch. 30, 48 Stat. 55 (1933).
18. Brake, supra note 14, at 580-81. See Federal Emergency Relief Act, ch. 30, 48 Stat. 55
(1933).
19. Exec. Order No. 7027 (1933).
20. Id.
21. Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act, ch. 517, 50 Stat. 522 (1937) (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. §S 1010-1012 (1982)).
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farms. 22 The Bankhead-Jones Act created the Farm Security
Administration in 1938, which succeeded the Resettlement
Administration. 23  The purpose of the Farm Security
Administration was to provide supervised, long-term loans to
farmers who could not obtain credit from other sources. 24
In 1946 Congress reenacted the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant
Act of 1937 as part of the Farmers Home Administration Act of
1946.25 This Act consolidated the Farm Security Administration
and all other emergency crop production, feed, seed, drought, and
rehabilitation loans that the Farm Credit Administration
administered. 26 This Act provided authority to make farm
ownership loans, farm operating loans, and emergency loans to
farmers unable to obtain credit from conventional sources. 27
Due to the increase in farming technology and the changes of
the credit needs of farmers, Congress passed the Consolidated
Farmers Home Administration Act in 1961.28 This Act
consolidated and updated the authority of the Secretary of
Agriculture (Secretary) to provide eligible farmers with direct and
insured loans needed to acquire, improve, or operate their farms. 29
Congress amended the Consolidated Farmers Home
Administration Act in 1972 and it became known as the
Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act. 30 This Act
consolidated the farm loan program and the rural housing loan
program. 31
The purpose of early federal involvement in agricultural
credit, as evidenced by the social legislation that evolved during the
Depression, was to aid the distressed and low income farmers.3 2
This legislation has consistently provided aid to farmers who were
unable to obtain credit elsewhere. 33 The Consolidated Farm and
2 2. Id. § Il(b).
23. Brake, supra note 14, at 581.
24. Id.
25. Farmers Home Administration Act, ch. 964, 60 Stat. 1062 (1946) (codified in scattered
sections of 7 U.S.C.).
26.Id. % 2, at 1062-63.
27. Id. S 44, at 1068-69. See Brake, supra note 14, at 582.
28. Curry v. Block, 541 F. Supp. 506, 510 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (construing the Agricultural Act of
1961, Pub. L. No. 87-128, tit. 3, 75 Stat. 294, 307) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7
U.S.C.).
29. S. Rep. No. 566, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. - , reprinted in 1961 U.S. COnE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2243, 2305.
30. Rural Development Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-419, 86 Stat. 657 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
31I. Id. Congress established the rural housing loan program to extend credit to farm owners to
improve their rural dwellings. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413 (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
32. Curry, 541 F. Supp. at 511. Federal intervention in agricultural credit shows a history of
Iitrm loan programs designed to aid the farmer who cannot obtain financing from another source. Id.
33. Id.
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Rural Development Act of 1972 (CFRDA) is the current authority
for providing agricultural credit to eligible farmers. 
3 4
The CFRDA consists of four subchapters." The first three
subchapters contain the substantive provisions of the Act, and the
fourth subchapter, which includes section 1981(d) of title 7,
contains the Act's administrative provisions. 36 Section 1981(d)
grants the Secretary authority for many loan servicing devices that
FmHA utilizes.
37
Section 1981a of title 7, enacted in 1978, grants additional
authority to the Secretary to defer principal and interest and to
forego foreclosure. 38  Few courts have addressed the issue of
whether the Secretary must take action under section 1981a. The
majority ofjurisdictions that have decided this issue, however, have
held that FmHA has a statutory duty to implement the authority
granted by section 1981 a.
39
34. Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act, Pub. L. No. 92-419, 86 Stat. 657 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as CFRDA] (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). For a
discussion of federal acts providing agricultural credit to farmers prior to the Consolidated Farm and
Rural Development Act, see Brake, supra note 14, at 580-84.
35. See 7 U.S.C. SS 1921-96 (1982). Subchapter I of the CFRDA authorizes the Secretary of
Agriculture (Secretary) to grant or insure real estate loans under the heading of real estate. 7 U.S.C.
§§ 1921-34 (1982). Subchapter II authorizes the Secretary to make or insure operating loans. 7
U.S.C. §§ 1941-47 (1982). Subchapter III authorizes the Secretary to make or insure loans when an
applicant's "operations have been affected by a natural disaster." 7 U.S.C. §5 1961-71 (1982).
36. 7 U.S.C. 551981-96 (1982)..
37. 7 U.S.C. 51981(d) (1982). Section 1981(d) provides that the Secretary may "compromise,
adjust, or reduce claims, and adjust and modify the terms of mortgages, leases, contracts, and
agreements entered into or administered by the Farmers Home Administration under any of its
programs, as circumstances may require ..... Id.
38. 7 U.S.C. 5 1981a (1982). Section 1981a grants the Secretary authority to defer principal and
interest "[in addition to any other authority that the Secretary may have to defer principal and
interest." Id. (emphasis added).
39. See, e.g., Curry v. Block, 541 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Ga. 1982). The Court in Curry held that 7
U.S.C. § 1981a imposed a mandatory duty on FmHA to consider granting deferral relief to eligible
recipients of farm loans. Id. at 517-18. See also United States v. Hamrick, 713 F.2d 69, 71 n.3 (4th
Cir. 1983) (recently promulgated regulations require FmHA to give notice to borrowers to enable
them to inquire about and apply for deferral relief under section 1981a); Matzke v. Block, 564 F.
Supp. 1157, 1166 (D. Kan. 1983) (FmHA has a statutory duty to consider, before exercising its
discretionary power to grant a deferral, whether the borrower is temporarily unable to continue
making payments due to circumstances beyond the borrower's control and whether the borrower's
standard of living will be unduly impaired by having to make such payments when due), aff'd, 732
F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1984); Gamradt v. Block, 581 F. Supp. 122, 129-31 (D. Minn. 1983) (both the
language and the legislative history of section 1981 a clearly contemplated the implementation of a
deferral program and FmHA must give the borrowers notice and an opportunity to obtain deferral
relief before FmHA takes any action against plaintiffs or depriving plaintiffs of property); Gates v.
Block, No. 83-6025-CV-SJ, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Mo. May 5, 1983) (holding that section 1981a was
not discretionary and that FmHA violated its statutory duty under section 1981a by not providing
borrowers with notice of deferral provisions and an opportunity for a hearing); Lehnert v. Block, No.
83-2328-M, slip op. at 7, 11 (W.D. Tenn. June 27, 1983) (holding that existing regulations did not
adequately implement 5 1981a and that FmHA must implement 5 1981a by issuing some notification
to plaintiffs and granting them an opportunity to request and be considered for deferral relief;
Allison v. Block, 556 F. Supp. 400, 403 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (the language of 7 U.S.C. 5 1981a was not
discretionary; FmHA enjoined from foreclosing on the plaintiffs' farm until FmHA provided
plaintiffs with notice and an opportunity to be heard), aff'd, 723 F.2d 631, 633 (8th Cir. 1983); But
see Ramey v. Block, No. 3-82-557, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 20, 1983) (the language of 5 1981a
was permissive on its face); Neighbors v. Block, 564 F. Supp. 1075, 1077-78 (E.D. Ark. 1983)
(plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction, based on FmHA's failure to notify or consider
plaintiffs for 5 1981a deferral relief, was denied because authority granted by § 1981a is permissive;
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In Curry v. Block, the court conducted an extensive review of
the federal government's involvement in agricultural credit.40 The
court examined the legislative history and statutory framework of
section 198 1a4l and concluded that it imposed a mandatory duty on
FmHA to consider granting deferral relief to eligible applicants. 42
III. THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - COLEMAN I
In Coleman v. Block the court had to decide whether the
Secretary should be enjoined from taking any adverse action
against FmHA farm loan holders until the FmHA promulgates
regulations implementing section 1981a.4 3 Before deciding this
issue, the court considered procedural objections raised by the
defendants concerning exhaustion of remedies, liabilities to suit,
and a motion for class certification. 44 The court determined that the
plaintiffs had presented facts sufficient to show that they had
exhausted other remedies, thereby shifting the burden to the
defendants to show the remedies had not been exhausted. 45 FmHA
the court did state that ifa borrower requests that FmHA defer his payment or forego foreclosure and
offers to make the showing required by § 1981a, the borrower must be given an opportunity to make
the showing; if he succeeds in making the proper showing, FmHA must consider the request in good
faith).
40. Curry, 541 F. Supp. at 509-14. The court found that the history of federal involvement in
agricultural credit indicated that the object of the legislation was to aid the underprivileged farmer
who could not obtain credit elsewhere. Therefore, the court concluded that the FmHA farm loan
program was a form of social welfare legislation. Id. at 511. The court noted that the interpretation of
§ 1981a should reflect the social welfare goals of Congress, such as its directive to keep existing farms
operating. Id. at 514 (construing 7 U.S.C. S 1921 (1982)).
41. Curry, 541 F. Supp. at 516-24 (examining 7 U.S.C. § 1981a (1982)). The court stated that
the existence of the word "may" in a statute did not necessarily mean the procedural
implementation of the statute was discretionary. Id. at 515.
42. Id at 521. Section 1981a gives the Secretary the authority to defer principal and interest
payments and forego foreclosure when due to circumstances beyond the borrower's control, the
borrower is unable to continue making payments without unduly impairing his standard of living. 7
U.S.C. § 1981a (1982). See supra note 6 for the text of 5 1981a. The court enjoined FmHA from
failing to implement 5 1981a. Curry, 541 F. Supp. at 525. The court ordered FmHA to provide the
plaintiffs with personal notice of the deferral provisions and to promulgate regulations on the
eligibility criteria of S 1981a similar to those used pursuant to the moratorium provision of the Rural
Housing Loan Program. Id. at 526. See 42 U.S.C. S 1475 (1982) (Rural Housing Loan moratorium).
The court found that 42 U.S.C. 5 1475 and 7 U.S.C. S 1981a were drafted with comparable
language but only 42 U.S.C. § 1475 was being implemented pursuant to regulations prescribing the
eligibility criteria. Curry, 541 F. Supp. at 517. The court determined that Congress therefore
impliedly intended 5 1981a to be implemented in a similar manner. Id. The court based its reasoning
on the standard rule of statutory construction that provides that similar language should be given
similar interpretation. Id. at 518 (citing Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 412
U.S. 427, 428 (1973)).
For regulations promulgated to implement 42 U.S.C. § 1475 (1982), see 7 C.F.R. S 1951.17
(1981) (amended by removing and reserving S 1951.17 and adding 7 C.F.R. S 1951(G) (1983)). For
provisions requiring notice of the availability of moratorium relief, see 7 C.F.R. S 1951.313(b) (1) (i-
iii) (1983).
43. Coleman v. Block, 562 F. Supp. 1353, 1359 (D.N.D. 1983).
44. Id. at 1355.
45. Id. The defendants argued that plaintiffs had three tiers of administrative review available
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failed to meet this burden when it failed to specify which plaintiffs
had not exhausted their remedies and which remedies the plaintiffs
had not exhausted.4 6
In order to qualify for class action status, the plaintiffs had to
meet the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.47  The court found that the plaintiffs had met all
the prerequisites of the federal rule and granted class certification to
the plaintiffs.48 The certified class consisted of all persons who had
received or who were eligible or might be eligible in the future to
receive a farm program loan that the FmHA would administer
through its offices within the State of North Dakota.4 9
After resolving the procedural objections raised by the
defendants and the issue of class action status, the court addressed
the primary issue: whether the court should grant a preliminary
injunction to the plaintiffs. 50 Plaintiffs asked the court for a two-
part injunction. First, they asked that the court enjoin FmHA from
taking adverse action against the holders of FmHA farm program
loans until FmHA promulgated regulations implementing section
under 7 C.F.R. §§ 1900.51-.60 (1982). Id. Congress, however, revised these regulations, eflective
April 1, 1982, to reduce steps in the appeal process and to reduce delays in completing the
administrative appeal process. Id. For the text of the revised regulations, see 47 Fed. Reg. 13,758
(1982) (codified in 7 C.F.R. § 1900.51-60 (1983)).
46. Coleman, 562 F. Supp. at 1355. The court determined that failure to exhaust administrative
remedies did not bar the plaintiff's action. Id. The court stated that the requirement of exhaustion of
remedies would impose an impossible burden on plaintiffs in the class of persons who held FmHA
loans but had not yet been foreclosed upon because the decision to foreclose or to accelerate the loan
must be made before it is possible to exhaust remedies. Id. The purpose of the doctrine of exhaustion
of remedies is for administrative rather than judicial resolution of dispute. Id. The litigation in the
instant case concerned the existence of several rights that the plaintiffs claimed were statutory and
constitutional in nature; such issues require resolution by thejudiciary. Id. at 1356.
The objective of exhaustion is to prevent premature interference with agency processes, to
enable the agency to function efficiently, and to give the agency an opportunity to correct its own
errors. The doctrine gives the parties and courts the benefit of agency experience and expertise and
allows the agency to compile a record that is adequate for judicial review. Id. at 1355 (citing
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975)).
47. Coleman, 562 F. Supp. at 1356.
48. Id. at 1356. Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure provides as follows:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf
of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claim or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Rule 23(b) provides:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are
satisfied, and in addition:
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole ....
Id. 23(b).
49. Coleman, 562 F. Supp. at 1359.
50. Id.
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1981a of title 7.51 Second, plaintiffs requested that the court enjoin
FmHA from taking any loan-servicing action that would deprive
the plaintiffs of property necessary for farm operation or living
expenses until FmHA promulgated regulations giving plaintiffs
notice of the action, the reasons for the action, and an opportunity
for a hearing before an impartial hearing examiner.5 2
The court applied a four-part test to determine whether to
grant injunctive relief. Under the test, the court balanced the threat
of irreparable harm to the plaintiffs, the harm to the defendants
from granting the injunction, the probability that plaintiffs would
prevail on the merits, and the public interest involved. 53
In analyzing the first factor, the court determined that if it did
not grant the injunction, the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable
harm. 54 They would lose their land and farm equipment and would
have to move from their farms. 55 In balancing the second factor,
FmHA did not present the court with any information indicating
that harm would result if the court granted the injunction.5 6 The
court recognized that an estimate of the financial harm to FmHA
would be highly speculative. The second factor, therefore, did not
weigh heavily in the court's decision. 57 The court next considered
the probability that the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits. 58 In
analyzing this third factor, the court considered separately the two
legal bases upon which the plaintiffs sought the injunction. 59
Initially, the court considered whether FmHA had refused to
grant certain rights explicitly or implicitly granted to borrowers in
section 1981a. 60 First, the court determined that FmHA must give
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C.L. Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981)). In the
balance, no single factor is determinative of whether to rant injunctive relief. The court must
consider the relative injuries to the parties and the public. gataphase Sys., Inc. v. C.L. Sys., Inc.,
640 F.2d at 113.
54. Coleman, 562 F. Supp. at 1359.
55. Id. at 1359-60.
56. Id. at 1360. The court stated that the injury to the plaintiffs would be the loss of their farms
and necessary living and operating expenses. Id. FmHA would suffer loss of interest on the loans and
loss of value in the security caused by delays resulting from following additional procedures. Id.
Implementing the procedures in North Dakota would involve some additional cost. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that FmHA had refused to recognize the following rights:
[T]he right to notice that loan deferral may be obtained; the right to a hearing to
present evidence for such a deferral; the right to a written decision specifying why
deferral was denied; the right to be provided more specific standards for establishing
deferral eligibility; and the right to appeal within the FmHA a denial of deferral.
Id. The court found that none of the rights plaintiffs sought were explicit in the statute and proceeded
to determine whether the statute implied the rights. Id. at 1361. Both sides presented cases in which
courts engaged in an extensive analysis of whether Congress' intent in drafting S 1981a implied the
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notice to the borrowers that deferral relief is available to applicants
who meet the eligibility requirements. 61 The statute explicitly states
that a borrower may request relief.6 2 The court determined that the
language of the statute implies that a borrower should know that a
loan deferral is available. 63
Second, the court found that FmHA must give the plaintiffs an
opportunity to be heard prior to FmHA's decision to terminate the
borrower's allowance for necessary living and operating expenses. 64
The court noted that it was necessary to hear the farmers'
contentions to obtain accurate information because the farmers are
the persons most familiar with the reasons for their inability to
make payments. 65 In addition, the court decided that FmHA must
give its borrowers a written statement informing the borrower of
the reasons why it did not grant a loan deferral. 66 The court found
that further specification of standards was necessary to give notice
to the applicant of the eligibility requirements for a loan deferral. 67
The court denied the right for an agency appeal of the
moratorium denial. 68 The court asserted that an opportunity to
have a hearing, a written decision stating the reasons for the denial,
and the requirement of more specific standards would insure that
the court give the borrowers' request for relief fair consideration. 69
The court did not require FmHA to adopt regulations to
implement section 1981a. The court believed that FmHA could
rights plaintiffs sought. The Coleman court determined that it could resolve the issue more directly.
Id.
61. Id. at 1361. The court determined that it was the responsibility of the FmHA to inform the
borrower of the loan deferral provisions. The court stated, "[W]e cannot expect the ordinary farmer
to, spend his extra hours in a federal depository, probably at least one 100 [sic] miles away from his
tart , reading the United States code and the Federal Register." Id.
62. See 7 U.S.C. S 19 81a (1982). The statute provides that "the Secretary may permit, at the
request of the borrower, the deferral of principal and interest on any outstanding loan made,
insured, or held ... by the Farmers Home Administration." Id.
63. Coleman, 562 F. Supp. at 1361.
64. Id, at 1361-62. A predetermination hearing is necessary because once termination of the
famier's income occurs, he will be permanently out of business and ineligible for a loan deferral. Id.
at 1362.
65. Id. at 1361.
66. Id. at 1362. The court stated that "a decision [requiring that FmHA provide its borrowers
with written statements of reasons for denying loan deferral] is required both to insure that the
Sccretary gives full consideration to the borrower's request and to give the borrower a basis on which
to review the decision." Id.
67. id. The court found that more specific standards were needed to inform a borrower of how
FttHA made its determination of living standards, how severe an impairment must be, what
constituted a reason beyond the borrower's control, how severe the reason must be, and how long a
temporary inability to pay may last. Id.
68. Id.
(9. Id, The court noted that two other deferral statutes did not contain regulations providing
for appeals of a denial of deferral. Id. See 7 U.S.C. S 1981(d) (1982), 42 U.S.C. S 1475 (1982). But see
7 C .F.R. % 1951.313(d), providing that upon denial of deferral on rural housing loans, under 42
U.S.C. S 1475, "[t]he borrower may appeal an adverse action on the request for moratorium,
extension, or cancellation of interest accrued during the moratorium." 7 C.F.R. S 1951.313(d)
(1983)).
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fulfill its statutory duty without promulgating additional
regulations. 70
After analyzing the probability that the plaintiffs would win on
the merits under the first part of the injunction, the court examined
the proposed injunction's second part.71 The court considered
whether it should enjoin FmHA from taking loan-servicing action
that deprived the plaintiffs of their property rights without due
process of law. 72
Before discussing the property rights, the court examined the
context in which the termination of living and operating expenses
occurs. 73 Once a farmer is eligible for a loan, the FmHA must
secure the loan by requiring a first lien on all property or products
acquired, produced, or refinanced with loan funds and by
additional security when necessary. 74  FmHA provides
management assistance 75 and credit counseling 76 to borrowers in
order to set up a farm home plan.7 7 When the annual income of a
borrower, pursuant to the farm home plan, meets or exceeds
predetermined expectations, FmHA releases its lien on the secured
property.78 The borrower uses proceeds from the sale of crops or
livestock to make payments according to the plan. 79 When the
income falls below that originally planned for the year, the county
supervisor for FmHA, in consultation with the borrower,
determines how to use the income.80 FmHA regulations give first
priority to paying farm and home expenses. 81 If, however, the
county supervisor believes that the borrower is in default, 82 the
70. Coleman, 562 F. Supp. at 1362. The court stated that FmHA could choose its own means to
implement § 1981a, as long as it did so adequately. Id. at 1362-63.
71. Id. at 1363. Plaintiffs asked that FmHA conduct its collection proceedings on FmHA loans
pursuant to constitutionally mandated standards, thus preventing FmHA from depriving plaintiffs
of valuable property rights without a hearing. Brief for Plaintiffat 1, Coleman v. Block, 562 F. Supp.
1353 (D.N.D. 1983).
72. 562 F. Supp. at 1363.
73. Id.
74. 7 C.F.R. § 1941.19 (1984). Additional security may consist of the best lien available in
chattels, real estate, or other property. Id. After acquiring a security interest, property acquired that
is of the same type as the collateral will be used to secure that debt. 7 C.F.R. S 1941.79(b) (1984).
This means that the debt will encumber property, livestock, or crops acquired after the security
agreement is made. Id.
75. 7 C.F.R. §1924.55 (1984).
76. Id. S 1924.56.
77. Id. S 1924.57(c). The county supervisor is responsible for assisting the applicant or borrower
in completing the plans required by planning with the applicant for appropriate use of income. Id.
The lirst priority for use of the income is for family living and farm operating expenses. Id.
1924.57(c)(4)(i).
78. Id. 1962.17.
79. Id.
80. Id. 1962.17(c).
81. Id. S 1962.17(c)(1).
82. Coleman, 562 F. Supp. at 1363. The regulations define default as "[fjailure of the borrower
to observe the agreements with FmHA as contained in notes, security instruments, and similar or
related instruments. " 7 C.F.R. § 1962.4(g) (1984).
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supervisor may decide to liquidate all secured property except that
which is essential for minimal family living needs.83 FmHA then
may refuse to release its lien on the proceeds of the borrower's crops
or livestock, thus cutting off the borrower's income. 84
With this background, the court considered whether FmHA
must grant the plaintiffs a hearing before terminating payment of
farm and home expenses.8 5 First, the court considered whether
FmHA's refusal to release the lien on crops and livestock without a
pretermination hearing constituted a deprivation of property
without due process.8 6 The court noted that in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp. 87 the Supreme Court held that a prejudgment
garnishment statute unconstitutionally violated due process
guarantees because it allowed the seizure of wages before any
judicial hearing.88 Likewise, in Fuentes v. Shevin89 the Supreme
Court found replevin statutes violated due process because they
allowed the seizure of chattel property without prior notice and an
opportunity to be heard. 90
The Coleman court distinguished Sniadach and Fuentes finding
that FmHA was a secured creditor unlike the creditors in Sniadach
and Fuentes.91 The court noted that it was a well-established rule of
law that, upon default by the debtor, a secured creditor has the
right to take possession of the collateral without prior judicial action
if the creditor can do so without a breach of the peace. 92 The court
found that FmHA, by refusing to release its lien on the borrower's
crops and livestock, was using self-help to take possession of its
83. 7 C.F.R. 5 1962.40 (1984).
84. 562 F. Supp. at 1363 (citing 7 C.F.R. § 1962.40 (1983)). When FmHA makes a decision to
liquidatc a loan, FmHA encourages borrowers to sell their property to pay the debt. 7 C.F.R.
§ 1962.41 (1984). If the borrower does not voluntarily sell the secured property within 60 days,
FtnHA gives the borrower notice that it will accelerate the loan and that the balance is due
immediately. Id. § 1872.17(c). FmHA notifies the borrower at this time that he has thirty days. to
request an appeal of the decision to accelerate the loan. Id. § 1900. 56(aX3). FmHA schedules a
hearing within 45 days of the request. Id. § 190 0 .56(c)(3). Generally the hearing officer will make a
lccision on the action within 30 days of the hearing. Id. 5 19 0 0. 5 7 (g).
85. Coleman, 562 Y. Supp. at 1363.
86. Id. at 1364.
87. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Plaintiffs argued that the farmer-borrower is in the same position as
the wage earner in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., in which the creditor seized the debtor's
wages prior to any judicial hearing. Coleman, 562 F. Supp. at 1364. See Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969).
88. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 342.
89. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
90. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-93 (1972).
91. 562 F. Supp. at 1364. Most of the creditors in Fuentes, however, were secured creditors who
had sold goods under conditional sales contracts. See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 70-72. The sales contracts
provided that upon a default, the seller could take back the merchandise. rd. at 95. The Supreme
Court stated that the waiver provision did not eliminate the appellant's right to a preseizure hearing.
Id. at 96. The Court held that the prejudgment replevin statutes were unconstitutional because they
denied an opportunity for a hearing before seizure of the chattels. Id. at 96.
92. 562 F. Supp. at 1364 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-49 (Supp. 1981), U.C.C. S 9-503
(1976)).
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collateral. 93
While the court rejected the Sniadach-Fuentes argument, it
found that participation of a borrower in the loan program
constituted a legitimate property interest. 94 The court also found
that FmHA's status as a governmental agency placed restrictions
on its loans that did not apply to commercial loans. 95
The court then applied the three-part test set forth in Mathews
v. Eldridge96 to determine whether due process standards required a
hearing prior to the termination of these governmental benefits. 97
The first part of the test examines the private interest involved. 98
The court found that this interest was significant. Termination of a
borrower's loan program begins with FmHA's refusal to release
income for necessary living and operating expenses. This refusal
can leave a farm family without money for food and force them to
quit farming.99
The second part of the test analyzes the risk of erroneous
deprivation. 100 The court found that the procedure followed by
FmHA was not adequate to protect against erroneous termination
of benefits. 101
The third part of the test involves the significance of the
government's interest. 10 2 The court found that the government's
interest in not providing more extensive pre-termination
procedures was slight. The court reasoned that FmHA already
provided for a hearing after the termination, and therefore the cost
93. 562 F. Supp. at 1364. Self help indicates that the parties have taken no priorjudicial action.Id.
94. Id. The court determined that FmHA loans were in part a form of social welfare and, as a
result, the farmers loan program was a governmental benefit in which plaintiffs held a valid property
interest. Id. The court found that when a borrower began a loan program with FmHA he had a
"strong expectation" that it would continue to its scheduled date and that he would receive the
necessary living and operating expenses as planned. Id.
95. Id. See also 7 U.S.C. S 1981(d) (1982), 42 U.S.C § 1475 (1982) (FmHA, unlike private
lenders, has wide authority to compromise or adjust loans); 7 C.F.R. § 1962.17(c)(1) (1983) (FmHA,
unlike private lenders, must make provisions for the borrowers' living and operating expenses); 7
C.F.R. S 1962.4(g)(1) (1983) (when a borrower is delinquent, FmHA must consider whether the
inability or refusal to make payments is due to lack of diligence, lack of sound farming, or other
circumstances within the borrower's control).
96. 424 U.S. 319(1976).
97. 562 F. Supp. at 1365 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)).
98. 562 F. Supp. at 1365.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1366. The court stated:
[T]he procedure used for termination is woefully inadequate if not nonexistent: it is
entirely unilateral; it requires no notice to the borrower prior to termination; it
provides no opportunity for comment; it provides no notice of the right to appeal the
termination until over sixty days after the termination of necessary living and
operating allowances; and it allows appeal of the termination, at the very earliest, over
60 days from the date of termination.
102. Id.
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of having the hearing before termination would not be
burdensome. 10
After considering all three factors, the court determined that
the plaintiffs' interest in having a hearing prior to the termination
of benefits outweighed the defendants' interest in not having the
hearing.10 4 The court concluded that the plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction had substantial merit. 05  Because of
insufficient evidence, however, the court did not rule on the
plaintiffs' contention that using state or district directors as appeals
officers subjected farmers to a biased tribunal.10 6
Finally, the court considered what effect granting a
preliminary injunction would have on the public interest.107 The
court stressed that the public interest was not only to save money,
but also to insure fair treatment of citizens and to avoid erroneous
termination of important benefits. 108 Based on the above analysis,
the court in Coleman I granted a statewide preliminary
injunction. 109
IV. THE PERMANENT-INJUNCTION - COLEMAN II
The case of Allison v. Block" ° was pending before the Eighth
Circuit at the time the plaintiffs in Coleman initiated their suit. "' In
Allison the United States Court of Appeals held that section 1981a
required the Secretary to establish uniform procedural and
103. Id. The court previously required FmHA to hold a pretermination hearing for loan
deferrals pursuant to § 1981a. The court noted that expanding this hearing to include the issue of
default would not create much additional cost to the government. Id.
104. Id. To implement a pretermination hearing, FmHA must give the borrower notice of his
opportunity to request a hearing on the validity of the termination and a statement of the reasons
why FmHA terminated his loan. Id. This hearing will give plaintiffs an opportunity to present
additional information and clarify any factual evidence. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1366. The due process clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested
tribunal. Brief for Plaintiff at 37, Coleman v. Block, 562 F. Supp. 1353 (D.N.D. 1983) (citing
Marshall v. Jemco, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980)). The plaintiffs claimed the FmHA's appeals process
was biased because appeals officers are involved in the initial decision to liquidate. 562 F. Supp. at
1366. See 7 C.F.R. 5 1962.40, 1960.5, 1960.13(a), 1900 (B) (1984). When FmHA liquidates loans
secured by real property, the hearing officer is chosen by his immediate supervisor, who made the
initial decision to liquidate the loan. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 1872.17(c), 1955.5 (1984).
107. 562 F. Supp. at 1366.
108. Id. at 1366-67. The court found that the public interest was basically the same as the
government's interest addressed earlier because the cost of providing a hearing prior to termination
of benefits would not be burdensome to FmHA since FmHA already provided for a hearing after
termination. Id. at 1366.
109. Id. at 1367.
110. 723 F. 2d 631 (8th Cir. 1983).
111. Coleman v. Block, 580 F. Supp. 194, 201 (D.N.D. 1984). In Allison v. Block the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected FmHA's contention that "Congress left the implementation
of section 1981a a matter of unfettered administrative discretion." Allison v. Block, 723 F. 2d 631,
635 (8th Cir. 1983).
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substantive standards applicable to deferral applications.1 12 The
court stated that the procedural requirements must include notice
and an opportunity to be heard. 113
The court also required FmHA to establish substantive
standards which, if met by a borrower, would entitle him to
deferral relief pursuant to section 1981a. 114 The court stated that
development of substantive standards would facilitate the
Secretary's good faith consideration of a borrower's eligibility for
relief. 1 15
The Allison decision was binding on the court in Coleman v.
Block. 116 Following Allison the court in Coleman rejected the
government's argument that section 1981a was discretionary and
that existing FmHA deferral regulations were adequate. 117
In Allison the court did not require FmHA to establish
substantive standards by formal rule making.11 The court held,
however, that FmHA must clearly articulate each section 1981a
decision in a matter susceptible to judicial review for abuse of
discretion. 11 9 In Coleman the court recognized this and declined to
require the Secretary to promulgate regulations to implement
section 1981a. 120 In addition, the court rejected the borrowers'
request for a further level of administrative review in cases where
FmHA denied section 1981a deferral relief. 121
The Coleman decision resolved several issues that the Allison
decision did not.12 2 For example, in Coleman the court required
FmHA to give borrowers notice and an opportunity to be heard
prior to the termination of allowances for living and operating
expenses. 123
In addition to the issues resolved by Allison, one of the first
issues the Coleman court addressed was whether the Administrative
112. Allison, 723 F.2d at 634.
113. Id. The court stated that the legislation which resulted in the enactment of section 1981a
was aimed at giving people a chance and helping farmers to stay on their land by halting farm loan
foreclosures. Id.
114. Id. at 636.
115. Id. at 638.
116. Coleman v. Block, 580 F. Supp. 194,201 (D.N.D. 1984).
117. Id.
118. Allison, 723 F.2d at 638. The court noted that formal rule-making would insure a more
uniform set of substantive standards to govern section 1981a requests. It realized, however, that
development of criteria through the adjudicative processes would give precedential effect to prior
FmHA loan deferral decisions. Id.
119. Id.
120. Coleman, 580 F. Supp. at 201 & n.48.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 201-12.
123. Id. at 208. The court concluded that FmHA must give borrowers notice and an opportunity
to present evidence before the county supervisor takes action to liquidate the mortgage and freeze the
borrowers' stream of income. Id. For the court's reasoning in requiring notice and an opportunity for
a hearing, see supra notes 85-109 and accompanying text.
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Procedures Act (APA) provisions regarding administrative appeal
hearings 12 4  applied to FmHA agency actions. 125 The plaintiffs
contended that under the provisions of the APA, the borrowers
could appeal FmHA agency decisions denying deferral relief based
on section 1981a. 126
APA provisions provide for judicial review for anyone who
suffered a legal wrong or was adversely affected by an agency
action. 127 The court stated that under FmHA regulations, the
Secretary may provide for appeal and review. 128 Since the APA
provisions provide for mandatory appeal and review and the
FmHA regulations grant the Secretary discretionary power to
provide for appeal procedures, the court found that the APA did
not apply to FmHA foreclosure, acceleration, and denial of deferral
hearings. 2 9  FmHA must base its decisions on statutory
requirements or on objective standards, or the decision may be set
aside if it was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 130
Upon finding that the APA did not apply to FmHA appeals,
the court considered whether the existing FmHA appeal
regulations met minimum procedural due process requirements. 131
Because the borrower is not notified of his right to appeal the
FmHA's liquidation decision until after the FmHA has stopped the
borrower's income stream, the court determined that the FmHA's
appeal procedures violated the due process clause of the
Constitution. 132 The court recognized the distinction imbedded in
124. Administrative Procedures Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 551-576
(1N82).
125. Coleman, 580 F. Supp. at 201-02. The provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA) apply to "every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after
opportunity for a hearing." Id. at 201 (emphasis added).
Provision for FmHA appeal and review procedures under 7 U.S.C. § 1983(b) are inconsistent
with the APA provisions. Under § 1983(b) the Secretary has discretionary power to provide for
appeal and review. Coleman, 580 F. Supp. at 201-02 (citing 7 U.S.C. 5 1983(b) (1982)). The court
reasoned that the plain language of the two statutes demonstrated that the APA appeal provisions did
not apply to FmHA foreclosure, acceleration, or denial of deferral hearings. Coleman, 580 F. Supp. at
202.
FmHA borrowers may not appeal FmHA decisions based on statutory requirements or on
tbjc¢iive standards included in published regulations. Id. at 201 n.48 (citing 7 C.F.R. § 1900.53(a)
(1983)). If, however, agency decisions are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with the law," a court or an agency can set aside the decision. Coleman,
581 F. Supp. at 201 n.48 (citing 5 U .S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1976).
126. Coleman, 580 F. Supp. at 201-02.
127. Id. at 201.
128. Id. at 201-02.
129. Id.
13(1. Id. at 201 n.48.
131. Id. at 202.
132. Id. at 203. The court discussed FmHA procedures as follows:
The decision to liquidate results in a major restructuring of the relationship between
the borrower and the government lender. The dual responsibility of running a form of
social welfare legislation while administering a loan program immediately transforms
into a single focus: reducing the loss incurred. In regards to the release of proceeds and
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 60:555
the law between farm products and inventory and equipment. 133
The court stated that the difference reflected a fundamental
element of our social thinking, i.e., that a laborer is worthy of his
hire. The "hire" of a farm operator is the crop he raises. The
farmer's interest in his crop is just as significant as a worker's
interest in his wages. The court noted that there are several laws
which reflect a concern for the person whose labor produces the
crops. 134
The court stated that given the impact of the decision to
liquidate, which freezes the debtor's income stream, and the fact
that FmHA already provided for a right to appeal, the appeal
process must be at a reasonable time and in a meaningful
manner. 35 The court then discussed the significance of two
Supreme Court decisions, Goss v. Lopez 136  and Mathews v.
Eldridge. 137
The court cited Goss for the proposition that in some cases, due
process does not require a full trial. 138 The Supreme Court in Goss
found that on a question of adjudicative fact, notice and an
opportunity for an informal hearing can satisfy due process. 39
The second Supreme Court case the Coleman court discussed
was Mathews v. Eldridge.1 40  The court cited Mathews for the
proposition that the main reason for denying a trial may be that the
all other general day-to-day decisions, no consideration is given to the possibility that
liquidation should not have occurred. After the unilateral decision to liquidate is
reached, "it is FmHA policy to liquidate all security .... " 7 C.F.R. 5 1962.40
(emphasis added). The only exception is for "EO [Economic Opportunityl property
that the county supervisor determines is essential for minimum family needs," but not
in excess of $600. Id. The county supervisor then attempts to persuade the farmer
to voluntarily liquidate. It is only after progress in obtaining a "voluntary-
liquidation has stopped, or sixty days after FmHA has frozen the farmer's income
stream by refusing to release his crop proceeds, that FmHA first informs a farmer-
borrower of a right to appeal from the decision to liquidate. 7 C.F.R. S 1900.56(a) (3).
Such a system does not comport with basic procedural due process considerations.
Id. at 202-03.
133. Id. at 203 (citing .C.C. § 9-109(2), (3), (4)).
134. Coleman, 580 F. Supp. at 203. The court noted that there are many laws which protect the
fruits of labor. The court listed several examples of these laws, such as wage protection in
garnishment statutes, wage claim priorities in bankruptcy proceedings, exemptions for process for
growing crops, and crop prodution liens. Id.
135. Id. at 203-04. The court stated that an appeal process meaningful in time and manner
would conport with FmHA's duty to assist farmers who need help. Id. at 204 & n.51A. The court
stated that FmHA should not make a decision to liquidate until it had exhausted reasonable efforts to
act wisely. Id. at 204.
136. 419 U.S. 565(1975).
137. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
138. Coleman, 580 F. Supp. at 205 (quoting K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ch. 13 (2d ed.
1979)). The court stated that providing a party with the nature of the evidence against him and
listening to what he has to say is in many cases a better procedure than that afforded by a trial-type
hearing, which is often cumbersome of expensive or both. Id. at 206 (quoting K. DAvis,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra).
139. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-84 (1975).
140. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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agency's informal procedure is adequate. 14 1 The court also noted
that Mathews required that the appeal process be meaningful. 142
Relying on Goss and Mathews, the court in Coleman determined that
an informal hearing prior to an agency decision to liquidate a loan
would satisfy procedural due process requirements. 14 3
While the court required FmHA to have an informal hearing
prior to agency action, the court found the existing appeals
procedures were adequate. 144 The plaintiffs had contended that the
existing appeal process subjected FmHA borrowers to a biased
tribunal. 145 The borrowers based their argument on the fact that
when FmHA liquidates loans secured by chattels, the hearing
officer on appeal was involved in the initial decision to liquidate. 146
When FmHA liquidates loans secured by real property, the hearing
officer on appeal was chosen by his immediate supervisor, who
made the decision to liquidate. 147
The court, however, found that the existing appeal procedure
was adequate to meet the due process standards. If the borrower
raised the issue of bias, FmHA could resolve that issue at later
stages of the review. 148 The court stated that a biased decision
constituted an abuse of discretion and as such, could be set aside. 149
After finding that FmHA's existing review procedures were
adequate, except that notice and an opportunity for a hearing must
come prior to agency action, the court determined that it had
properly granted the plaintiff's motion to expand the statewide
class to a national class. 150 The court also found that the national
class properly excluded those borrowers who were already involved
141. Coleman, 580 F. Supp. at 207 (citations omitted). The contribution of Mathews is the notion
that adequate informal procedures may make trial-type hearings unnecessary and possibly
undesirable. Id. The court noted that a protected property interest must exist before the due process
rights of notice and a hearing arise. Id. at 207-08 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332
(1976)). While the Coleman court questioned the desirability of this requirement, it clearly found that
a property interest existed in a chattel mortgage. Id. at 208. The court recognized the distinction
between a security interest and a possessory interest in the mortgaged property. The court did not,
however, elaborate on the rights attendant to each interest. Id.
142. Id. at 203-04.
143. Id. at 208.
144. Id. The court held that, while existing FmHA review procedures were adequate,
FmHA must redesign the procedures so that a review of the decision to liquidate would take place
before FmHA took action to liquidate. Id. The court also held that FmHA may keep notes of the
hearings as opposed to keeping a verbatim record. Id.
145. Coleman v. Block, 562 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (1983). The court in Coleman Istated that it did
not have sufficient evidence to address the plaintiffs' arguments regarding the built-in bias of using
the state director or other district directors as hearing officers, and would consider this issue in its
order for a permanent injunction. Id. at 1366.
146. Id. at 1366. See supra note 106 and accompanying text for a discussion of the FmHA's
appeal process.
147. Coleman, 562 F. Supp. at 1363.
148. Coleman v. Block, 580 F. Supp. 194, 208 (1984).
149. Id. at 201 n.48; 208.
150. Id. at 208.
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in a suit that raised Coleman issues. 151
FmHA contended that the nationwide class should not include
potential members of the class in districts or circuits where a court
had already decided or borrowers had raised issues from Coleman. 152
The result of such an exclusion would be that the rule of law in
those circuits or districts would bind class members even though
they were not litigants in those circuits or districts. 153 The court
denied FmHA's argument, concluding that this would fragmentize
the class into dozens of subclasses, and as such, would undermine
the judicial economy and efficiency of national class actions. 154
The court found that the injunction did not apply in situations
where:
1) a borrower had abandoned the property; 155
2) a borrower knowingly and voluntarily consented
in writing to the foreclosure; 156
3) a borrower was guilty of conversion; 157
4) a borrower had initiated bankruptcy and the
trustee in bankruptcy abandoned the property to the
United States or another lienholder, and the borrower
was discharged in bankruptcy. 158
The final issue the court resolved was whether it should make
the injunction permanent. 159 In determining this issue in favor of
151. Id. at 208-09. Coleman issues include the implementation of 7 U.S.C. S 1981(a), the
constitutionality of a pre-hearing cut-off of necessary living and operating expenses, and the
constitutionality of the FmHA's appeal process. Id. at 208.
152. Id.
153. Id. The court noted that if a class member brought a suit in a circuit that had resolved
issues from Coleman, the circuit decision would bind the district court. Id. at 208-09. In addition, the
principle of res judicata would bar from the nationwide class FmHA borrowers who had actually
litigated their claims and received a final judgment. Id. at 208.
154. Id. at 208-09.
155. Id. at 209, 211. The court excluded borrowers who had totally abandoned the property.
The court stated that FmHA could take preventative measures to protect secured property when
there was an emergency situation, such as "inevitable irreparable injury due to abandonment of the
property." Id. at 209. Once the risk no longer exists, FmHA must comply with the injunction. Id. at
211.
156. Id. at 209, 211. The court stated that FmHA could proceed against farmers who knowingly
and voluntarily consented in writing to foreclosure. The court stated, however, that when a borrower
consents to foreclosure after FmHA has terminated or substantially reduced living and operating
expenses, FmHA must establish in a later proceeding challenging the foreclosure that the borrower
voluntarily made the decision to allow foreclosure. Id. at 211.
The court stated that the farmer's decision should not be a result of the termination or reduction
of benefits and that the borrower should make his decision with knowledge of his right to appeal and
to request deferral relief under section 1981 a. Id.
157. Id. at 209, 211. The court stated that even though a borrower was guilty of conversion,
determined either by admission or judicial adjudication, FmHA must still give the borrower an
opportunity to apply for deferral relief under section 1981a. Id. at 211. FmHA may, however, take
steps to prevent injury to the property, terminate living and operating expenses, and initiate
foreclosure. Id.
158. Id. at 209, 211-12.
159. Id. at 209-10.
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the borrowers, the court applied a three-part test. 160 The court
considered whether the plaintiffs had succeeded on the merits,
whether equity required granting injunctive relief, and the form of
injunctive relief the court should grant. 161
The court determined that at the trial, the borrowers had
succeeded on the merits of their claim by obtaining the temporary
injunctive relief that was the basis of their suit. 162 The court
found that the claims of the plaintiffs were well-founded and as a
result, determined that the law should afford the borrowers a
remedy. 163
In balancing the equities, the court considered the threat of
irreparable harm to the borrowers, the harm to FmHA, and the
public interest. 164 In Coleman I the court had extensively evaluated
the same factors when it made its decision to grant a preliminary
injunctive relief. 167 The relief the court granted required FmHA to
contained in the order granting a preliminary injunction, the court
granted a permanent injunction. 166
The final issue the court addressed concerned the form of the
injunctive relief. 167 The relief the court grantedrequired FmHA to
give borrowers across the nation notice and an opportunity to be
heard prior to the termination of benefits. 168
V. CONCLUSION
The Coleman decisions, unlike prior decisions, determined that
the farmers' interest in continuing participation in the farm loan
program was a constitutionally protected property interest. t 69
These decisions modify FmHA's right to liquidate the farmer's
debt under the security agreement. Unlike other secured creditors,
160. Id. at 209.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 210.
165. Id. See supra notes 53-109 and accompanying text for a discussion ofthe Coleman Ifactors.
166. Coleman, 580 F. Supp. at 210. The court granted the permanent injunction based on the
evidence presented at the trial on the merits, the national scope of FmHA's regulations, and the
parties, stipulations that the statewide class was representative of the national class. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. Benefits protected include previously determined living and operating expenses and any
property used to secure an FmHA loan. Id. The required notice must inform the borrower of his
right to an informal hearing to determine eligibility for § 1981a relief, include a written statement
containing the factors necessary to establish that relief, and contain a written statement of the reasons
for the proposed termination or liquidation. Id. The notice must also inform the borrower of the
official who would preside at the informal hearing. The court stated that that official cannot be
sameone who was actively involved in the initial determination to liquidate the loan. Id.
169. Coleman, 562 F. Supp. at 1364-65.
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FmHA can no longer declare default and take possession of the
collateral without notice and a hearing. 170
The Coleman decisions also prohibit FmHA from
accelerating or foreclosing on farm borrowers until the agency
informs the borrowers of their right to contest the action. FmHA
must also inform the borrower of his right to request deferral
relief. 7 ' FmHA can no longer demand voluntary conveyance or
attempt to deprive farmers of any property secured by FmHA
unless it first gives notice of the right to request a deferral. 172
These decisions also prevent FmHA from terminating
previously determined living and operating allowances unless
FmHA first informs the borrower of the reasons for the
termination, the right of the borrower to challenge the termination,
and the right to apply for deferral relief. 17 3 Farm Home Plans may
become the subject of negotiations because FmHA can no longer
unilaterally terminate assistance based on the assumed protection
found in the security agreement. 17 4
JULIE A. KRENZ
170. Coleman, 580 F. Supp. at 210-11. FmHA cannot take collection actions that have adverse
effects on the assistance called for in the farm and home plan. North Dakota Lawsuit: Pre-Termination
Hearing Required, SMALL FARM ADVOCATE 8 (1983).
171. 580 F. Supp. at 210-11.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Brief Guide to Security Agreements: New Role for FmHA Farm Plans, SMALL FARM ADVOCATE 6
(1983).
